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The article focuses on multiple cases of 
the politicization of history by the Baltic 
political elites. Three states of development 
of the politics of memory in the Baltic 
States are identified. Problems of political 
exploitation of the past are scrutinized in 
the context of political life and interna-
tional relations. It is concluded that the 
narratives of the past where Nazi and So-
viet legacies are equated are actively pro-
moted on the pan-European level. Elites of 
the Baltic states play a salient role in this 
process and enhance ties with the elites of 
the Eastern Europe, expert and political 
communities of the Western Europe and 
USA. The dominant trends in the develop-
ment of the historical politics in the Baltic 
countries are the administrative and le-
gislative instruments for approval of the 
preferred narratives of the past, as well as 
an active political work at the international 
level aimed at the inclusion of the Baltic 
narratives of the past into the European po-
litics of memory. Historical politics of the 
Baltic states shows the Baltic countries as 
the victims of "two totalitarianisms" ("Nazi 
and Soviet occupation"), and this point of 
view is widely used as a foreign policy tool. 
The politicization of the "anti-totalitaria-
nism" issue is now a popular foreign policy 
tool that not only serves the interests of the 
Baltic and Eastern European politicians, 
but also finds ideological supporters in 
Western Europe and the United States. 
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Interpretation of history is an im-
portant element of building a state and 
determining the ideological aspect of 
this process. In Eastern Europe, after 
the disintegration of the USSR, the po-
liticisation of history took on a distin-
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ctive character [11]. The policy of memory1 pursued by the Baltics presents 
the essence of this process and thus deserves special attention. 
The research interest in the problems of consolidation of political and na-
tional communities increased in the second half of the 20th century. Con-
structivism — the primary theory in studying nationalism — became very 
influential in political science. Its key thesis suggests the ‘artificial’ origin of 
national communities, which are ‘invented’ by elites using myths and sym-
bols transferring (and creating) the memory of the past [22]. The state is at 
the core of this process2. 
Despite the ongoing discussions about the ‘artificial’ or ‘natural’ origin 
of national communities3, it is evident that the political consolidation of a 
society requires elites to pursue a consistent policy. Such efforts are not lim-
ited to the political goals of members of power groups, but they also use the 
available resources — material, administrative, and symbolical ones. 
It is important to differentiate the notions of ‘politics of memory and 
‘politics of commemoration’, the latter being a system of rituals, practices, 
and patterns used in teaching history (commemorative days, holidays, award 
system, etc.). Politics of memory can be defined as a range of measures to 
promote certain interpretations of the events of the past to achieve certain 
political goals4. The agent of the politics of memory is either the state or po-
litical parties/influential social groups. The objectives of the politics of 
memory and the intensity of their achievement can differ as well as methods 
to achieve them. In a broad sense, the politics of memory facilitates the ‘in-
vention’ of traditions5 in line with certain political goals of the power 
groups. According to E. Hobsbawm’s classification, the ‘invention’ of tradi-
tions can serve three purposes — the consolidation of communities, legiti-
mation of authority, and inculcation of values and norms of behaviour. How-
ever, in practice, these purposes are usually combined. 
                                                     
1 The notion of the ‘politics of memory’ (Geschichtspolitik) gained common usage 
in Germany in the 1980s as the ‘Historians’ Dispute’ about the origins of Nazism 
arose. German chancellor H. Kohl presented the Herman society with the idea of a 
moral and political turn to encourage patriotism and alleviate the guilt complex. The 
critics of this approach — including J. Habermas — reproached the advocates of the 
‘turn’ for politicising history through using the term ‘politics of memory’. Over the 
next two decades, the initially negative subtext of this notion blurred. The politics of 
memory was increasingly interpreted not as the politicisation of memory but rather 
as preserving the memory of the past necessary for the political consolidation of the 
nation. The term gained common usage in Eastern Europe in the course of nation 
building and developing the ideological framework for new regimes after the disin-
tegration of the USSR. 
2 The construction of a centralised bureaucratic state was necessitated by wars and 
economic development, which required an ideological and worldview unity of the 
social groups residing on its territory. For more detail see [6; 38]. 
3 For more detail, see [7].  
4 For more detail, see [15]. 
5 E. Hobsbawm defines the ‘invention of tradition’ as “a set of practices, normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which 
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition” [26, р. 165]. 
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A major theoretical and methodological problem is the development of a 
clear definition of the subject area and the criteria for collecting empirical 
material for studying the politics of memory. The interdisciplinary nature of 
this research area complicates the operationalization of conceptual ap-
proaches. This article focuses on certain public incidents interpreted as part 
of systemic efforts of political elites6 to affect the politics of memory and 
politicise history7. This takes place at four basic levels: establishing and sup-
porting institutions dealing with the politics of memory, adopting laws fo-
cused on the past and the politics of memory, participating in or supporting 
certain measures directly affecting the politics of memory, participating in 
debates on the past and addressing the past in the political rhetoric. The ob-
ject of research determines the set of research methods: case analysis, dis-
course analysis, and institutional analysis. This approach makes it possible to 
describe the key features of the politics of memory in the Baltics and identify 
major trends and prospects. 
All countries of post-Soviet space are active in the field of the politics of 
memory [3]. However, the models applied differ significantly. In Central 
Asia, a widespread practice is publishing books about heads of state giving 
an unambiguous interpretation of national history. In Eastern Europe, the 
space for academic and public discussions is much broader; therefore, power 
groups use a wider range of tools. 
After the disintegration of the USSR, the politics of memory became a 
popular tool for achieving domestic and foreign policy goals in Eastern 
Europe8. These include the legitimation of authority, distracting public atten-
tion from the actual agenda, improving the position of the state in interna-
tional negotiations, etc.9. Despite the differences in the goals, there is a num-
ber of commonalities giving the politics of memory a practical dimension. 
As Russian historian A. I. Miller stresses, the politics of memory can be pur-
sued only from the position of a ‘victim’, since it requires using past suffer-
ing not only as a mobilising force but also for ‘guilt export’ [14]. 
                                                     
6 This article uses the definition of political elites formulated by O. V. Gaman-Golut-
vina, “a social internally cohesive groups comprising a minority of the society and 
having sufficient resources to affect major strategic decision within the polity [5].  
7 The author considers the politics of history from the perspective of political science 
and focuses on the politicisation of history — addressing the past by political actors 
in political contexts. For more detail, see [41].  
8 A rather accurate generalisation of the Eastern European politics of memory is 
made by A. I. Miller, “In many neighbouring countries, there are political forces 
consciously turning history into a tool of political struggle. In international relations, 
they strive to secure the role of the ‘guilty party’ for some countries, primarily Rus-
sia, and that of a ‘victim’ for their own trying to gain certain moral advantages. 
Through demanding that Russia repent and compensate for the actual and imaginary 
sins, describing the country as an incurably aggressive imperial nation, and creating 
an image of Russia as a hostile ‘alien’, the advocates of the politics of memory re-
gard it as a handy tool to develop the national identity of the country’s population, to 
struggle with their political rivals, and to marginalise certain population groups, in-
cluding the Russian minority, if any” [16].  
9 For more detail on the goals of the politics of memory, see [11]. 
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G. V. Kasyanov identified the features which are common to the current 
politics of memory of Eastern European states [12], which include ethnic 
exclusivity of suffering, confrontation with elements of xenophobia, empha-
sis on ‘sacred’ suffering of the nation’, and the responsibility for all evil 
placed on external forces, primarily communism, etc. 
Let us analyse the politics of memory in the Baltics. Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia are often classed under limitrophe states [32] as a cultural area 
that has few or none of the attributes of historical statehood [40, р. 80]. The 
‘deficit of history’10 results in the Baltic identifying themselves at the current 
stage as ‘Europe, but not completely Europe’ and necessitates major efforts 
to ‘create a new history’ of statehood. 
One cannot ignore the fact that, with the disintegration of the USSR, the 
Baltics became the last boundary for the US to employ the ‘grinding strategy’ 
in the post-Soviet space to fragment potential opposition to American inter-
ests11. This also affects the policy pursued by the Baltic elites, calls for an in-
strumental approach to history, and necessitates its political ‘adaptation’. 
The development of the politics of memory in the Baltics has three main 
stages. The first stage covers the period from the early 1990s to the early 
2000s. This was the time of the formation of new political regimes in the 
Baltic states and the time of increasing aspiration towards integration into 
the Euro-Atlantic space. The ‘singing revolutions’ brought to power the so 
called ‘moral politicians’12 — members of the scientific and artistic commu-
nity. Their primary goal was the symbolical formalisation of new political 
regimes, the de facto invention and governmentalisation of nationalism13. 
One of the most ardent advocates of this approach is V. Landsbergis, who 
served in key government positions in Lithuania in the 1990s and considered 
himself a follower of A. Smetona14. 
                                                     
10 In the case of Lithuania, it is the single-minded cultivation of the legacy of the 
Great Duchy of Lithuania, which allows the members of the elite to state that “when 
we celebrate the Millennium of Lithuania, we are celebrating our millennium in 
Europe” (from a speech delivered by the president of Lithuania V. Adamkus on July 
6, 2009). Hwoever, this point of view is not universal. As E. Hobsbowm comments 
on the situation in the first quarter of the 20th century, “The victorious Germans set 
up three small Baltic nation-states for which there was no historical precedent at all, 
and— at least in Estonia and Latvia—no noticeable national demand. They were 
maintained in being by the Allies as part of the ‘quarantine belt’ against Bolshevist 
Russia” [26]. 
11 A. D. Bogaturov defines ‘grinding strategy’ as ‘a policy towards the formation of 
and support for a network of not particularly strong or stable states… valuing the US 
support, which makes them susceptible to American recommendations” [4, p. 364]. 
12 The ‘moral politician’ phenomenon emerged in Eastern Europe and the South 
Caucasus in the early 1990s. For more detail see [20]. On ‘moral politicians’ in the 
Baltics see [21]. 
13 In the Baltics, ethnicity was widely used as a resource for political mobilisation 
even before the cessation from the USSR in 1991 in the course of establishing paral-
lel governmental bodies. See, for example [2]. 
14 Antansa Smetona was a dictator who seized power in Lithuania in 1926 by coup 
and fled the country for Germany in 1940. On V. Landsbergis’s symbolical succes-
sion to A. Smetona see [29]. 
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In these conditions, the politics of memory was in demand primarily by 
the new political leadership who were in desperate need for resources avail-
able from the cost perspective, effective in terms of mass results, and neces-
sary for the ideological justification of their position in power and the new 
policy. The Baltics declared a new continuity doctrine establishing a connec-
tion between the new political regimes and the governments of the inde-
pendence period before World War II. The central ideologemes were those 
of ‘returning to the West’ and ‘Soviet occupation’. 
In the mid-1990s, the positions of ‘moral politicians’ mostly weakened. 
The new leadership (most of whom had been part of the nomenklatura not 
long before) were faced with the need to strengthen power against the back-
ground of political and economic transformation and instability. The path of 
excluding national minorities from the political process15 chosen by the Lat-
vian and Estonian elites was embodied in the ‘alien’ institution. 
In that period, the politics of memory was institutionally formalised. Un-
der the auspices of the governments, special institutions — museums and 
commissions promoting and aggressively protecting a certain historical in-
terpretation — were established. Later, they were given an increasingly sa-
cred status16. National parliaments establish commissions that calculated the 
damages from ‘Soviet occupation’17. The ‘communist legacy’ became a uni-
versal political response of the elites to current problems in the economy and 
institutional development. However, this is also a means to reconcile the 
democratic ideology necessary for the Western integration with the ethnic 
nationalism excluding national minorities from the political process (the 
‘alien’ institution in Latvia and Estonia, the problem of Polish minority in 
Lithuania)18. The ‘Russian threat’ is also actively exploited as part of the 
                                                     
15 In the early 1990s, Latvia and Estonia adopted the laws establishing the institution 
of ‘aliens’ — residents of the republics with limited political, economic, and social 
rights. Almost all residents of the republics not descending from the pre-war resi-
dents of Latvia and Estonia were affected by the law. They were labelled ‘Soviet 
immigrants’. According to some estimates, their accounted for 40 % of the Latvian 
and 30 % of the Estonian population in the early 1990s [33, р. 33]. 
16 The best-known institutions are the Genocide and Resistance Research Cen-
tre of Lithuania, Commission of the Historians of Latvia, Estonian Institute of Histo-
rical Memory. Museums of Nazi and Soviet occupation were established in Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Estonia. They are regularly visited by Western politicians. In 2013, 
following an eight-year hiatus, the International Commission for the Evaluation of 
the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania resumed its ac-
tivities according to a decree of the President of Latvia D. Grybauskaitė. 
17 In Estonia, the process of estimating the damages from the Soviet occupation was 
launched in 1992. In Lithuania, the Seimas adopted the law on compensating the dam-
ages from the Soviet occupation in 2000. In 2005, a commission on estimating the 
occupation damages was established according to a declaration of the Latvian Saeima. 
18 Following the Baltics’ accession to the EU, the traditional criticism for mass vio-
lation of human rights in =Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was expressed by interna-
tional organisations. Critical reports and statements were made by the relevant bod-
ies of the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, PACE, European Commission, and vari-
ous international human rights organisations. 
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‘securitisation discourse’ justifying the aspiration of the political elite to join 
the Euro-Atlantic security space19. 
The second stage in the development of the politics of memory in the 
Baltics began with the accession of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to NATO 
and the European Union in 2004. Despite the common expectations, this did 
not make the Baltics’ politics of memory less confrontational. An alternative 
path was the discussions on the ‘Baltic identity’ of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia originating in the ‘historical Baltic region’. However, it did not at-
tract close attention of the Baltics politicians [35]. 
M. Mälksoo stresses that the existential politics of becoming Europeans 
did not lose its significance after the Baltics’ accession to NATO and the 
EU. However, today its purpose is not joining the European identity, but ex-
tending this identity to the borders of Russia. ‘The self-conceptualization of 
the Baltic states as victims of Russia’s historical wrongdoings and European 
indifference has strong repercussions for their vision of the EU’s foreign pol-
icy: the EU is placed in the position of owing a debt to the Baltic states, and 
persistent quests are consequently made to have Baltic claims accommo-
dated within the common foreign policy of the Union’, M. Mälksoo argues 
[31, р. 289]. 
The goal of ‘rejoining the Western family of peoples’ was a powerful 
element of the legitimisation of political elites in the Baltics. The achieve-
ment of this goal could not but create an ideational vacuum that had to be 
filled. In effect, the Baltic elites faced an institutional trap (the so called ‘bad 
infinity’). The taglines of ‘Soviet occupation’ and ‘Russian threat’ were ef-
fectively the foundation of the ‘alien’ institution in Latvia and Estonia. The 
loss of usual attention to these topics would very likely result in a deep po-
litical crisis. The Baltic politicians understood the seriousness of these 
risks20. Therefore, appeals to the past and nationalism became a universal 
argument. These taglines served the purposes of not only legitimising public 
institutions but also retaining their attractiveness as tools of everyday politi-
cal struggle. Latvian scholars B. Zepa and I. Supule argue that the political 
elites “still use ethnicity to win votes. Thus politicians become a key cata-
lyser of increasing ethnic tensions” [10, p. 9]. 
The Lithuanian scholar V. Safronovas stresses that the Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration of Lithuania necessitated a massive campaign for “memory proc-
essing” and “inculcating pro-Western attitudes.” Moreover, regular efforts 
were made to turn ‘resistance to occupations’ of the mid-20th century into the 
                                                     
19 For instance, the role played by the Soviet legacy factor in Lithuania can be illus-
trated with an excerpt from the memoirs of the former US Secretary of State James 
baker. When reminiscing about his first visit to the Baltics, he writes that the mem-
bers of Latvian and Estonian political leadership would speak of expanding trade 
and economic cooperation, whereas the heads of state focused on the ‘Soviet threat’. 
For more detail, see [28]. 
20 A conspicuous statement was made in 2005 by the Chair of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the Latvian Seimas, Vaira Paegle: “If we abandon the concept of 
occupation, we will threaten our policy on citizenship, aliens, their rights, and other 
key issues. Of course, we cannot take this step” (Vesti segodnya, May 21, 2005). 
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highest value. ‘Historical justice’ was attained through denying the previous 
regime (also through criminalising alternative evaluations) using the proce-
dures of lustration, etc. [18]. 
Since 2004, the politics of memory pursued in the Baltics and Eastern 
Europe in general has become increasingly confrontational [17]. One of the 
most apparent manifestations of the confrontation was the infamous ‘memo-
rial wars’ in the Baltics21. However, major trends were of a greater scope and 
included the ongoing glorification of Nazism22, exploitation of the ‘Soviet 
occupation’, and the identification of the Soviet regime with the Nazi one. 
Members of international diasporas joining the Baltics’ political elites in the 
1990s-2000s accelerated these processes23. Nazi collaborationists and their 
descendants were very influential in the Baltic diaspora communities. 
The famous Lithuanian historian Č. Laurinavičius stresses that the inter-
pretation of the events of World War II in Latvia is politically driven. He 
emphasises the political underpinning of the position adopted by the Lithua-
nian power groups. On the one hand, the then policies of the Baltic states are 
justified by any means. On the other hand, blame is placed on the Soviet Un-
ion whenever possible. As a result, the ‘Eastern neighbour’ is pictured as an 
eternal enemy, which is used later for manipulative purposes depending on 
the political situation in the country [13]. 
The feeling of uncertainty after the accession to NATO and the EU, 
which led to a series of political crises, strengthened the ‘anti-totalitarian’ 
                                                     
21 The major incidents taking place alongside a large number of smaller ones include 
the removal of the memorial to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn in 2007 (the ‘Bronze Sol-
dier’), numerous attempts to remove the monument to Soviet liberators in Riga’s 
Pārdaugava district, the plans of Latvian authorities to remove the Soviet statues 
(also those of the Red Army soldiers) in Vilnius. At the same time, new monuments 
are erected, for instance a monument to the Latvian SS members in the town of 
Bauska. 
22 The most remarkable events included regular marches of SS in the Baltic capitals 
and the pompous funerals of Nazi collaborators. In 2014, SS veteran H. Nugiseks 
was buried with ceremony in Estonia. In 2012, J. Ambrazevičius was reburied with 
ceremony in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Activist Front headed by Ambrazevičius was 
behind the massacre of Jews in Lithuanian during World War II. The ideology of 
this organisation is concisely expressed in the article “What do the Activists fight 
for?” by the chair of the propaganda commission of the Lithuanian Activist Front B. 
Raila published on May 10, 1941: “The repercussions of the past centuries and espe-
cially the Bolshevist occupation caused considerable damage to the body of the 
Lithuanian people, contaminated Lithuanian soil with disgusting microbes, and 
spread numerous weeds. Therefore, the Lithuanian Activist Front is determined — 
having restored new Lithuania — to cleanse the Lithuanian people and Lithuanian 
soil of Jews, parasites, and degenerates. Therefore, the principal objective is clean-
sing of Jews.” For the full text, see [39]. 
23 The position of president has been held by former US diaspora members US citi-
zens V. Adamkus (1998—2003, 2004—2009) and T. Ilves (2006 — present). Vaira 
Vīķe-Freiberga, a citizen of Canada, served as President of Latvia in 1999—2007. 
Members of international diasporas have also served high positions in the parlia-
ments and diplomatic and law enforcement agencies of the Baltic states. 
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rhetoric of the political elites [1]. These processes coincided with the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space, which produced a new wave of history 
politicisation24. 
The third stage in the development of the politics of memory in the Bal-
tics is associated with the beginning of the 2010s. However, its prerequisites 
were emerging throughout the previous two decades. The key trend is the 
promotion of local ‘version’ of the past at the European level. To this end, the 
international platforms of the OSCE, European Parliament, PACE, European 
Court of Human Rights, and NATO Parliamentary Assembly, etc. are used25. 
The processes of European integration taking place over the past two 
decades have contributed to reconciliation and an active dialogue between 
the ‘national versions’ of the past in Western Europe. The formation of the 
so called ‘post-national policy of remembrance’ suggesting a variety of in-
terpretations of the past based on acknowledging the — to a degree — com-
mon responsibility of the European states for the Holocaust. The accession 
of the Eastern European states to the EU led to a gradual transformation of 
the established model. The historical debates became increasingly heated 
[37], as the Eastern European states started to promote their ‘national’ histo-
ries presenting these countries as victims of ‘two totalitarianisms’ — the 
Nazi and primarily the Soviet ones. 
An accurate definition of this process was given by the German scholar 
K. Volk: “the nationalisation of remembrance of the terror of the Soviet oc-
cupation [in the Baltics] … tends to establish a cultural memory of universal 
victimhood, ignoring the dark sides of the nation’s history, i. e. the collabora-
tion with Stalin’s Russia as well as with the Nazi regime, but especially the 
long tradition of anti-Semitism in these countries” [42]. These historical con-
tradictions were coupled with the aspiration of the Baltic elites to improve 
their status and expand their resource opportunities in the EU, which resulted 
in the intensification of the politics of memory at the European level. The 
efforts of the Baltic leadership were targeted at both the level of the EU in-
stitutions and the intergovernmental level of Easter European states. The 
Baltic elites were given a greater opportunity to promote their ‘historical 
agenda’ in the context of the Ukraine crisis, which increased distrust of Rus-
sia and reduced the number of research and diplomatic contacts between the 
EU and Russia [17]. 
                                                     
24 In particular, under the presidency of V. A. Yushchenko, Ukraine embarked on the 
‘Baltic path’ in the politics of memory opening museums of ‘Soviet occupation’ and 
trying to establish the idea of the Holodomor as the cornerstone of state legitimacy. 
25 A good example is the reaction of European institutions to the celebration of the 
60th anniversary of Victory Day in Moscow. The European Parliament adopted a 
resolution (May 12, 2005) on World War II stressing the “magnitude of the suffer-
ing, injustice and long-term social, political and economic degradation endured by 
the captive nations located on the eastern side of what was to become the Iron Cur-
tain” [24]. PACE adopted a resolution (June 22, 2005) calling for Russia to provide 
compensation to those persons deported from the occupied Baltic states and 
the descendants of deportees (italics mine. — V. S.) [34]. 
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However, one cannot say that the Baltic politics of memory have been 
shifted from the national to supranational level. The latter rather became a 
new platform for implementing the approaches to the politics of memory 
tested and still developing at the national level. 
In the Baltics, politicians continue to exploit the ‘Russian threat’ tagline 
in the framework of the populist programme for mobilising the voters [27]. 
R. H. Simonyan argues that manipulations with the ‘concept of occupation’ 
make it possible for the radical national parties to mobilise a significant part 
of voters in the course of the parliament election [19]. However, shifts that 
are more dramatic also take place: a politicised interpretation of the past is 
formalised at the legislative level assuming a normative, binding character. 
In 2010 and 2014, the parliaments of Lithuania and Latvia respectively 
adopted laws on criminal liability for the denial of ‘Soviet occupation’. In 
summer 2015, Lithuania plans to try in the court of law the Russian citizens, 
who participated in ensuring security during the unrest in Vilnius in January 
1991. The politically driven trial is aimed at discrediting Russia as the ‘legal 
successor to the criminal state of the USSR’26. 
In 2013—2014, the Lithuanian parliament discussed replacing the 
‘Lithuanian SSR’ with ‘occupied Lithuania’ in the place of birth entry of 
Lithuanian citizens’ IDs. 
Earlier the interest in the politics of memory was stimulated through po-
litical declarations, cultural and educational policies, and sporadic censor-
ship in the mass media. Today the process has ‘matured’ to criminalising the 
denial of the ‘versions of the past’ sanctioned by the government. In effect, 
the Baltics’ space of the politics of memory is gradually contracting under 
the pressure of administrative and legislative mechanism bordering on state 
ideology. 
The ‘historical and ideological’ innovations in the legislation of the Bal-
tics could be considered as an attempt to ‘tighten the screws’ on the domestic 
policy. However, a more probable explanation relates to the course towards 
drawing an equivalence between the Nazi and Soviet regime. Hence the 
Holocaust and the ‘crimes of communism’ go under the common label of the 
‘crimes of totalitarianism’, which was adopted by the Baltic elite. This hy-
pothesis is corroborated by the attempt to pass similar laws in the European 
Parliament. In 2010, the European Commission rejected calls to introduce a 
                                                     
26 The prosecution is based on the thesis that, in January 1991, the USSR committed 
an act of ‘aggression’ against Lithuania as an independent state. Alternative interpre-
tations of the 1991 events are forbidden. Former Vice-Mayor of Vilnius A. Paleckis, 
who questioned this interpretation, was prosecuted, stripped of state awards, and 
made the target of a discrediting campaign in the mass media. The case of January 
1991 events was classified in Lithuania in 2010 as a military crime and a crime 
against humanity, which has no period of prescription. Approximately 80 Russian 
citizens are suspects in this case. Several dozen arrest warrants were issued through 
Interpol. This criminal case alongside ‘minor’ cases of an attack on a Lithuanian 
customs point in the village of Medininkai in July 1991 (seven Lithuanian died in 
the attack, former OMON officer Mikhailov was convicted in Lithuania) create the 
ideological and propaganda backbone of the modern political regime in Lithuania.  
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so-called double genocide law drawing equivalence between the ‘crimes of 
communist regimes’ and the Holocaust and introducing criminal liability for 
their denial and trivialisation. This law was drafted by Lithuania, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Czech Republic. 
The pro-European course of the Baltic elites coupled with the condemna-
tion of the ‘crimes of totalitarianism’ contradicts, at first sight, practices of 
glorifying Nazism, which are widely spread in the Baltics. A symbolic ex-
ample is the so-called ‘Lihula crisis’of 2004. This Estonian town erected a 
bas-relief depicting a soldier in the SS uniform with the inscription ‘To Es-
tonian men who fought in 1940—1945 against Bolshevism and for the resto-
ration of Estonian independence’. In less than two weeks, the monument 
was taken down by the Estonian authorities without a public discussion. This 
gave rise to heated debates about the weakness and dependency of the na-
tional government. Estonian ultranationalists desecrated several monuments 
to Soviet soldiers. 
The analysis of this collision makes it possible to see the bigger picture 
behind the pro-European course of the politics of memory adopted by the 
Baltic elites. Two years prior to the publication of the law on double geno-
cide, in 2008, an issue of the Estonian Diplamaatia journal, which was dedi-
cated to the 90th anniversary of Estonia’s independence gained in 1918, pub-
lished an article by J. Luik [30] — a former Estonian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Minister of Defence. 
The reasoning presented in the article rests on the thesis that the ac-
knowledgment of the Holocaust was not only a result of the Nuremberg tri-
als and the contribution of historians but also a product of political struggle. 
J. Luik suggested abandoning the attempts to revise the history of Nazism in 
the Baltic states and focus on superimposing the ‘Nuremberg principles’ on 
the ‘crimes of communism’. The key objective is reaching an international 
political consensus on the issue. The new doctrine should have been sup-
ported first by the post-communist societies as ‘victims of totalitarian 
crimes’. Major efforts were to be focused on the social sphere rather than the 
legislative level. 
The recent initiatives prove that the Baltics’ political elites pursue this 
course of action both in their domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, the 
‘Russian threat’ serves as a logical complement to a wider political agenda. 
The Baltic elites strive to appeal not only to the interest but rather to the 
identity of Western partners [1]. 
A universal argument is the ‘Nazi and Soviet occupation’ constructed 
within the politics of memory at the European level. It is paradoxical but 
Moscow is not the key target of this policy, although the Baltic elites de-
mand compensation only from Russia. The basic premise of this approach is 
the ‘equivalence of the crimes’ of Hitler’s Germany and the USSR and the 
acknowledgement of the European’s responsibility for failing to prevent the 
‘two occupations’ of the Baltic states. However, the Baltics often see the US 
only as a guarantor of the ‘European status’ and the patron of small states 
that ‘fell victim to totalitarianism’. Positioning themselves as victims of ‘to-
talitarianisms’, the Baltic leaderships strive to make Europe atone for ‘con-
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nivance’. In this case, the priority is not only the ‘targeted’ attempts to influ-
ence the attitudes of the European decision-making elites but also the impact 
on the public opinion and the political circles in the EU and the creation of a 
corresponding political atmosphere in Europe. 
This influence is manifested in numerous resolutions of European inter-
national organisations, some of which were discussed above. With a wide 
support from the Baltic politicians, the topic of ‘communist totalitarianism’ 
is put on the agenda of international conferences stirring a broad European 
political intellectual discussion. A good example is the 2013 European par-
liament hearing ‘David and Goliath: small nations under totalitarian rule’ 
organised by I. Vaidere, a European Parliament member from Latvia27. At 
the same time, the European Parliament held the exhibition ‘Totalitarianism 
in Europe’. 
It is also worth mentioning The Soviet Story documentary directed by a 
far-right Latvian historian (today, a politician) Edvīns Šnore. The central 
idea of the film dubbed in English and targeted at the European audience is 
drawing equivalence between ‘Hitlerism and Stalinism’. Russian historians 
produced ample evidence of the biasedness in selecting ‘historical facts’ and 
falsifications used in the film [8]. However, the director’s political career re-
ceived a boost. E. Šnore was elected as the For Fatherland and Free-
dom/LNNK party member to the Saeima; in 2014, he was appointed the 
chair of the Latvian Commission for Calculating the Damage Inflicted during 
the Soviet Occupation28. 
Despite the attention paid to the politics of memory by the highest Baltic 
officials, the attempts at an independent analysis of the facts underlying the 
sanctioned version produce a defensive response. In February 2015, the 
website of the Centre for Geopolitical Studies connected with the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an article entitled “Immoral attempts 
to rewrite history” [23]. The author voices concerns over Russia publishing 
and studying documents corroborating the facts of ‘collaboration of Eastern 
European countries with Nazis’. The article stresses that these findings are 
attempts to change the traditional interpretation of the history of Eastern 
Europe and dubs the historical research ‘immoral’. This eliminates the pos-
sibility of a scientific dialogue, which is being replaced with ‘moral censor-
ship’. ‘The dissemination of this propaganda is becoming dangerous. It does 
not only affect Russia, but also extends to the global community’, the author 
argues. Therefore, the analysis of the solid fact of the active participation of 
Baltic units in the Nazi crimes is called ‘propaganda’ that is ‘immoral’. 
The politicisation of ‘anti-totalitarianism’ is a popular foreign policy tool 
serving the interests of not only the Baltic and Eastern European politicians 
but also attracting followers in Western Europe (the New Philosophers) and 
                                                     
27 The emphasis was placed on the discrimination of the Chechen, Crimean Tatar, 
and Karelian small nations. According to I. Vaidere, the conference aimed “to bring 
to light the fact that many people were persecuted, deported, tortured, or killed during 
totalitarian Communism” [25]. 
28 For more on Lativa’s politics of memory see [9]. 
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the US (the Neoconservatives). The accusations of totalitarianism fit the 
‘grinding’ strategy used by the US throughout the post-Soviet space29. A new 
stage in the development of the politics of memory in Eastern Europe began 
in 2015 against the background of the Ukraine crisis. Its specific features is 
the inventions and declaration of historical ideologemes at the level of the 
Eastern European leadership30. 
In conclusion, one can stress that the key trends in the development of 
the politics of memory in the Baltics include the use of administrative and 
legislative tools by the political elites in order to support the preferred ‘ver-
sion of the past’ as well as political efforts at the intergovernmental level 
aimed at including the Baltic ‘versions’ of the past into the European politics 
of memory. 
The politics of memory pursued by the Baltic regimes depicting the Bal-
tics as victims of ‘two totalitarianisms’ (the ‘Nazi and Soviet occupation’) is 
widely used as a foreign policy tool. In the Baltics, the politics of memory 
developed in three stages. The first one (the early 1990s-mid 2000s) formal-
ised the doctrines of ‘returning to the West’ and ‘Soviet occupation’, which 
were instrumental in consolidating the voters and legitimising the Baltic el-
ites that had replaced the communist leadership. The second stage following 
the Baltics’ accession to NATO and the EU in 2004 made the politics of 
memory increasingly confrontational rather than expanded the conflict-free 
space. In the late 1990s, the premises for the third stage emerged, namely, 
taking the discussion of the equivalence between Nazism and Communism 
to the European level. In this process, the Baltic politicians have a rather re-
markable role alongside the elites from other Eastern European states play-
ing the political card of the ‘victim of totalitarianism’. This rhetoric is tar-
geted at the West, whereas the image of ‘Russian aggression and totalitarian-
ism’ serves as means to stimulate the discussion. The political intention of 
the Baltic elites is to exploit the combination of the ‘guilt complex’ and ‘ex-
ternal threat’ to secure close attention of the West to the Baltic states and 
accumulate additional resources. 
                                                     
29 All potentially powerful states and alliances beyond the Euro-Atlantic military and 
political space are declared heirs to totalitarian ideologies. A side effect of the strug-
gle with the ‘germs of totalitarianism’ through the active ‘anti-totalitarian’ politics 
of memory at the European level is the rejection of the idea of strong statehood. This 
logic covers not only the traditional criticism of Russia and China for ‘authoritarian 
tendencies’ but also prevents a rapprochement between Russia and Germany. 
30 The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Schetyna stated that Auschwitz had 
been liberated by Ukrainians, whereas the Ukrainian Prime Minister A. P. Yatsenyuk 
spoke of the “Soviet invasion of Ukraine and Germany.” It is worth noting that the 
‘historical escapades’ of the Eastern European officials were preceded by the state-
ment made by the US Ambassador to Serbia M. Kirby in September 2014 claiming 
that “Belgrade was liberated by the 3rd Ukrainian Army”. At the same time, against 
the background of the blunt statements and the anti-Russian campaign in the mass 
media (also taking place in Poland) the Massacre in Volhynia moved to the periph-
ery of public debates. 
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The active politics of memory justifying the institutional discrimination 
of national minorities in the Baltics and serving as a foreign policy tool cre-
ated an institutional trap. The rejection of the role of an ‘outpost’ (‘frontline 
states’) in the struggle against ‘Eastern threat’ and the historical past of ‘to-
talitarianism’ is fraught with a deep political crisis in the Baltics. The active 
politics of memory legitimise not only the political regime but also the Bal-
tics’ political system in general. 
Today, there are trends towards a more conformational politics of mem-
ory in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. As the analysis shows, these processes 
had started long before the Ukraine crisis. Currently, one of the key objec-
tives of the Baltics’ politics of memory is to influence the public opinion of 
the EU states to inculcate the idea of equivalence between Nazism and 
Communism. 
This confrontational politics of memory gradually diminishes the oppor-
tunities for the Baltic elites to adjust this course. The conflict of geopolitical 
interests of the major powers in Europe will toughen the politics of memory 
pursued by the Baltic elites and bring about new attempts to formalise its 
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